Musical chairs: a comment on the credit crisis. by Caballero, R J. & Krishnamurthy, A.
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review – Special issue on liquidity ￿ No. 11 ￿ February 2008  9
Musical chairs: a comment on the credit crisis
RICARDO J. CABALLERO
Professor of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
ARVIND KRISHNAMURTHY
Professor of Finance
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management
Uncertainty –that is, a rise in unknown and immeasurable risk rather than the measurable risk that the 
ﬁ  nancial sector specializes in managing– is at the heart of the recent liquidity crisis. The ﬁ  nancial instruments 
and derivative structures underpinning the recent growth in credit markets are complex. Because of the 
rapid proliferation of these instruments, market participants cannot refer to a historical record to measure 
how these ﬁ  nancial structures will behave during a time of stress. These two factors, complexity and lack 
of history, are the preconditions for rampant uncertainty. We explain how a rise in uncertainty can cause a 
liquidity crisis and discuss central bank policies in this context.ARTICLES
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S
ince the summer of 2007, world ﬁ  nancial 
markets have been embroiled in a severe 
liquidity crisis. The current situation is 
particularly surprising if one considers the initial 
conditions. At the start of 2007, ﬁ  nancial markets 
had substantial liquidity and investors were charging 
low prices for bearing risk.  Banks were liquid and 
well capitalized, with a substantial buffer relative 
to their regulatory capital requirements. Similar 
statements of health could have been issued for all 
of the key pieces of the ﬁ  nancial system. As late 
as May of 2007, it would have been hard to predict 
that losses on subprime mortgage investments 
could have precipitated a crisis of the magnitude 
we are witnessing. For one, the subprime losses 
were relatively small: even worst-case estimates 
put these losses at USD 250 billion, which is a drop 
in the bucket relative to the trillions of dollars 
of ﬁ   nancial instruments traded in the world’s 
marketplaces. Moreover, for anyone in the know, 
defaults on subprime mortgages were expected. 
The subprime market is the riskiest segment of 
the mortgage market, so it is hardly surprising that 
some borrowers would default on their loans. Yet 
the incidences of defaults have been the trigger for 
the current severe liquidity crisis that has ensnared 
markets from consumer credit to corporate credit.
Why has this happened? The heart of the recent 
crisis is a rise in uncertainty –that is, a rise in 
unknown and immeasurable risk rather than the 
measurable risk that the ﬁ  nancial sector specializes in 
managing. The ﬁ  nancial instruments and derivative 
structures underpinning the recent growth in credit 
markets are complex. Indeed, perhaps the single 
largest change in the ﬁ  nancial landscape over the 
last 5 years has been in complex credit products: 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), collateralised 
loan obligations (CLOs), and the like. Because of the 
rapid proliferation of these instruments, market 
participants cannot refer to a historical record 
to measure how these ﬁ   nancial structures will 
behave during a time of stress. These two factors, 
complexity and lack of history, are the preconditions 
for rampant uncertainty.
When defaults on subprime mortgages occurred, many 
market participants were taken by surprise at how 
their investments were reacting. The most prominent 
example of this is the case where AAA subprime 
tranches suffered losses. At this point, investors had 
become uncertain about their investments.
If the uncertainty was conﬁ  ned to subprime mortgage 
investments, given the relatively small size of the 
subprime sector, the ﬁ  nancial system could have 
absorbed the losses without too much dislocation. 
However, investors started to question the valuation of 
the myriad other credit products –not just mortgage– 
that had been structured in much the same way as 
subprime investments. The result was uncertainty 
across the entire credit market.
To understand how uncertainty can move an 
economy from excess liquidity to a liquidity crunch, 
an analogy may be useful. In the children’s game of 
musical chairs, when the music stops, only one child 
will be left without a seat. However if the children 
are confused about the rules and each is convinced 
that he will be the one left without a seat, chaos may 
erupt. Kids may start grabbing on to chairs, running 
backwards, etc.
In the same way, in today’s market, uncertainty 
has led every player to make decisions based on 
imagined worst-case scenarios. Market players 
that have the liquidity stay out of markets or pull 
back dramatically. Some participants question 
whether their counterparties have hidden losses 
on their books and grow wary of trading with these 
counterparties. Others hoard their liquidity to 
cover a worst-case shock that may never occur. But 
the ﬁ  nancial markets need participants and their 
liquidity in order to function. When many players 
disengage due to uncertainty, the effective supply 
of liquidity in the ﬁ  nancial system contracts. Those 
that need liquidity are unable to get it and ﬁ  nancial 
markets turn illiquid.
To make matters worse, the uncertainty over losses 
is concentrated in the world’s largest and most 
reputable banks. In most previous crises, the largest 
banks would beneﬁ  t from inﬂ  ows during investors’ 
ﬂ  ight to quality and could therefore act as a ﬁ  nancial 
stabilizing force. This natural stabilizer is absent 
during the current episode. Today, banks do not lend 
to other banks. Less informed non-bank investors 
follow suit. The result is a halt in credit of all kind, 
which has transformed a ﬁ  nancial markets’ problem 
into a problem for the economy at large.
What should central banks do in this case? They 
must ﬁ  nd a way to re-engage the private sector’s 
liquidity. Re-engagement will only occur as agents’ 
uncertainty over outcomes is reduced.ARTICLES
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A central bank’s mission is to stabilize the economy, 
as a whole, and not individual participants. When 
viewed as a whole, the worst-case scenarios that 
guide the behavior of each market participant 
cannot simultaneously occur. Like musical chairs, 
when the music stops, only one child will be left 
without a seat, not every child. The subprime shock 
at the end of the day is a small shock; it is only 
the actions of panicked investors that have made it 
large. The standard recipe in such a ﬂ  ight-to-quality 
scenario is for central banks to convincingly promise 
large liquidity injections in the event of a meltdown.   
Indeed, the response of central banks back in 
August 2007 to the emerging crisis was more or less 
textbook in terms of ﬂ  ight-to-quality containment, 
although with hindsight, we can say that it was 
behind the curve in terms of magnitude.
But if central banks have largely done the right thing, 
why is the turmoil not over? Part of the answer 
comes from “newness” itself. The current crisis 
is the result of the confusion created by complex 
credit products. As the initial response of the central 
banks failed to quell the crisis, markets have grown 
to fear whether central banks have the necessary 
liquidity/instruments to act as a lender of last 
resort during the current crisis. This introduces a 
second layer of uncertainty aversion which in turn 
reduces the effectiveness of central banks to deal with 
the panic caused by the ﬁ  rst layer of uncertainty.
At some level, these worries are misplaced. The 
central bank can affect the supply of liquidity; this is 
its core policy tool. The recent liquidity injection by 
the ECB of EUR 340 billion can go some way towards 
demonstrating that central banks exert control over 
liquidity supply. What’s next? Possibly more dramatic 
steps need to be taken in order to convince the market 
that there is a lender of last resort.
At the end of the day, it is important to recall that 
the potency of a successful intervention comes 
from its credibility, and this requires that ﬁ  nancial 
market participants be convinced that the lender 
of last resort is ahead of the game. The paradox is 
that with credibility, the likelihood of having to 
deliver on the promise is minimal, but the reduced 
anxiety fostered by a credible commitment restarts 
private liquidity circulation and over time helps 
restore normalcy.
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